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Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, the Sherman Act,
and Economic Welfare
A Reply to Professor Markovits
Richard A. Posner*
The editors of the Stanford Law Review have invited me to comment
on Richard Markovits' massive article on the legal control of oligopoly
pricing under the antitrust laws.' The article takes issue with my views on
the subject as expressed in an article published in the Review some years
ago.2 I welcome this opportunity both to reply to Markovits' specific criticisms of my views and to comment on his approach to an important issue
of public policy.
I.

BACKGROUND TO THE CONTROVERSY

Some background is necessary to make the differences between Markovits and me intelligible to the reader. When the Sherman Act 3 was passed
in 189o, American industry was apparently rife with cartels. I use the term
"cartel" to refer to the kind of full-blown, above-board, price fixing scheme
in which the parties, untroubled by threats of legal sanction, create a formal
and often elaborate machinery of agreement and enforcement in order to
cope with the difficulties of reaching agreement and of preventing cheating
that plague price fixers. Exclusive sales agencies, revenue pooling, production quotas, customer and territorial allocations, provisions for arbitration of disputes, and fines for violating the cartel agreement are among the
mechanisms by which cartels seek to maximize the profits from price fixing.
Section i of the Sherman Act forbids contracts, combinations, and
conspiracies in restraint of trade and, although not vigorously enforced in
*A.B. 1959, Yale University; LL.B. 1962, Harvard University. Professor of Law, University of
Chicago. George L. Priest and George J. Stigler made helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
piece.
I. The four-part article contains a total of 152 pages. Markovits, Oligopolistic PricingSuits, the
Sherman Act, and Economic Welfare, Part I, Oligopolistic Priceand OligopolisticPricing: Their Conventional and Operational Definition, 26 STAN. L. RaV. 493 (1974); Part IT, Iniurious Oligopolistic
PricingSequences: Their Description, Interpretation, and Legality under the Sherman Act, 26 STAN.
L. Rav. 717 (1974); Part I1, Proving (Illegal) Oligopolistic Pricing: A Description of the Necessary Evidence and a Critique of the Received Wisdom About Its Characterand Cost, 27 STAN. L. REv.
307 (1975); Part IV, The Allocative Efficiency and Overall Desirability of Oligopolistic PricingSuits,
28 ST,%w.
L. REv. 45 (i975). And Part IV virtually incorporates by reference another 43-page article
(see id. at 47): Markovits, The Causes and Policy Significance of Pareto Resource Misallocation: A
Checklist for Micro-Economic Policy Analysis, 28 STAN. L. R . 1 (1975)2. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. x562
(1969).
3. I5 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
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its early days, largely eliminated the formal cartel from the industries subject
to it. In many cases, however, cartels simply were driven underground to
become secret price fixing conspiracies. They were not, of course, any the
less unlawful by virtue of being concealed, and the law enforcers did their
best to pursue them underground, but the enforcement methods used were
ill adapted to dealing effectively with price fixing in its new, noncartel
form. In particular, the rule against price fixing, which in its original form
had emphasized the economic effects of collusive pricing, degenerated into
a prohibition against attempting to fix prices by overt conspiratorial methods, involving secret meetings in hotel rooms, methods of bid rotation
designed to conceal the existence of the conspiracy, and other affirmative
acts of communication and concealment; the focus of the rule shifted from
the economics of collusion to conspiratorial behavior."
The process by which the rule against price fixing was virtually emptied
of any economic content, to become in effect a branch of the criminal law
of conspiracies and attempts, had a number of unfortunate side effects,'
only one of which I shall discuss here: it rendered antitrust enforcers
virtually helpless to deal with any case of collusive pricing in which the
conspirators did not leave behind them a visible trail of communications
or acts of concealment. Conceivably the conditions of a market might be
such as to enable the sellers in it to collude without leaving detectable traces
of an overt conspiracy, and if so they would be beyond the reach of the law.
As an illustrative if extreme case, one can imagine a group of sellers able
to collude without any overt contact or communication, simply as a result
of a mutual recognition that all would be better off if the market price were
higher, simultaneously prompting each seller to raise his price to the desired
level. Such a case is probably rare, but it is entirely possible that some market
settings permit collusive pricing with so little actual communication among
the sellers as not to expose them to an appreciable danger of being prosecuted for price fixing. Moreover, whether a case involves oligopolistic
pricing without explicit collusion, or overt conspiracy under such favorable
conditions as to generate no evidence of conspiracy, is a distinction without
a policy difference. From the standpoint of the trier of facts, both are cases
of oligopolistic pricing, or "tacit collusion," which is my term for any form
of collusion not detectable by means of the conventional, noneconomic
approach to proving culpable price fixing.'
Any residual hope that tacit collusion might be effectively controlled
4. Compare United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and
afi'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), with United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-26 n.59
(1940). See R. POSNER, ANerrRusr LAw: AN EcoNomic PERsPECTrVE h. 3 (forthcoming).
5. For a fuller discussion of these effects see R. POSNER, supra note 4, chs. x & 4-7.
6. A full explanation of "tacit collusion" is found in Posner, supra note 2, at 1566-93.
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by section i of the Sherman Act was dashed by Donald Turner's influential
article on conscious parallelism, published in 1962.' Turner argued that
oligopolistic pricing is inherent in the structure of highly concentrated
markets and cannot be prevented without changing market structure. It is
impossible, he argued, to expect an injunction against oligopolistic pricing
to be effective, for such an injunction would command the oligopolists to
do the irrational: ignore the effect of a price cut by one seller on the price
and output of the others. In a competitive market, sellers act as "price
takers"; that is, they act under the assumption that they can sell at the
current market price any quantity they produce without affecting the market price. In a highly concentrated market, in contrast, the seller is aware
that if he increases his output the market price will fall and his total profits
may be reduced. This awareness, Turner argued, discourages oligopolistic
sellers from competing effectively in price.
My 1969 Stanford Law Review article argued that Turner's suggested
dichotomy between competition and oligopoly was overdrawn; there is no
fundamental difference between a market with many sellers and a market
with few.' In either one there is both competitive pressure on each seller to
expand his output to the point where his price is equal to his marginal
cost, and countervailing pressure to establish effective methods of collusion
that will enable the sellers to restrict their output and thereby increase their
profits above the competitive level. Thus, it is not irrational for oligopolistic
sellers to behave competitively, that is, to carry output to the point where
price and marginal cost are equal, and no doubt many oligopolists do just
that. The only difference between competitive and oligopolistic markets is
that, other things being equal, collusion is easier to arrange and maintain
in the latter and perhaps in a rare case may even be practiced successfully
without resort to any acts of overt communication. The difference between
the problem of collusion in competitive and in concentrated markets is
thus one of degree. The true significance of number of sellers is simply as
one of the factors bearing on the feasibility of collusion with minimum
communication.
If this analysis is correct, then the problem of the legal control of tacit
collusion has nothing to do with the character of the remedy to be applied
in a tacit collusion case or the thought processes of the sellers in concentrated
markets, as Turner believed; the problem is proving the existence of collusive pricing in a case where evidence that the sellers have actually communicated with one another is unobtainable. Since collusive pricing is never
7. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HAnv. L. Rv. 655 (1962).
8. See Posner, supra note 2, at 1566-75.
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an unconscious state, there should be no problem of compliance with an
injunction forbidding it. The problem, to repeat, is proof of collusion by
economic evidence alone.
My article suggested several different kinds of evidence that could be
used to establish the existence of collusion in the absence of traditional
evidence of price fixing such as secret hotel meetings and the like. I have
returned to the problem of evidence several times since then;9 my latest
writing on the question discusses twelve kinds of economic evidence that
might be used to establish collusive pricing." In my view, such evidence is
always relevant and often essential in a price fixing case, but exclusive
reliance on such evidence is proper only with respect to markets in which
conditions are so propitious for collusion 1 as to enable the sellers to collude
without actually communicating with one another or at least without
leaving any detectable traces of their communications.
Attacking tacit collusion in this manner under section i of the Sherman
Act should be feasible, and is clearly worthwhile at least on an experimental
basis. Although there is little academic support for such an approach, one
increasingly encounters approximations to it in plaintiffs' theories in private
antitrust suits attacking collusive pricing; 2 there is judicial support for it, '
and there is no authoritative precedent standing in its way.1" I emphasize
that the soundness of the proposed approach depends only on the ability
of economic analysis in particular cases to generate evidence that will persuade a responsible trier of facts both that a given market can be cartelized
without detectable acts of collusion and, if so, that it has been cartelized.
9. R. PosNEA, supra note 4, ch. 4; R. PosNER, ANfrrtusr: CAsEs, EcoNomic NoTs, AND Ornm
MATERLS 128-35 (x974); Posner, A Program for the Antitrust Division, 38 U. Can. L. Rav. 500,

514-25 (1971). Although the first-cited work was not available to Professor Markovits when he was
writing his article, the others were. I am surprised that he limits his discussion to my 1969 article and
does not consider the more mature formulations of my position.
io. They are fixed relative market shares; systematic price discrimination; exchanges of price
information; regional price variations; identical bids; price, output, and capacity changes at the formation of the cartel; resale price maintenance; declining market shares of leading firms; amplitude
and fluctuation of price changes; demand elasticity at market price; abnormal profits; and basing-point
pricing. R. POSNER, supra note 4, ch. 4.
ii. As indicated by such characteristics as market concentration on selling side, no fringe of
small sellers, inelastic demand at competitive price, entry takes a long time, many customers, standard
products, firms sell at same level in chain of distribution, price competition more important than other
forms, high ratio of fixed to variable costs, demand static or declining over time, sealed bidding, and
a previous record of price fixing. R. PosNER, supra note 4, ch. 4.
Thus, I envisage a two-stage inquiry in a tacit collusion case. The first is to discover whether the
market has enough predisposing characteristics to collusion to support an inference that the firms
could collude effectively without generating evidence of collusion of the usual sort. If so, the second
stage is to discover whether they are in fact colluding, as indicated by their economic behavior. The
purpose of the first stage is to exclude from consideration markets in which tacit collusion is too unlikely to succeed to be worth worrying about.
12. See, e.g., Funderburk, Price Fixing in the Liquid-Asphalt Industry: Economic Analysis
Versus the "Hot Document," 7 ANcrrrusr L. & EcoN. R1v. Fall 1974, at 61.
13. Especially in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 8o9-Xo (1946); Wall
Products Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp. 295, 315-16 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
14. See R. PosNER, supranote 4 , ch. 4.
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II. A Summniy oF MAEXoviTs' PosmoN

Markovits' position on the Turner-Posner debate requires a detailed
summary because of the length of his article and his writing style-to which
I react as did one reader to Bentham's prose: "I felt as though I had been
asked to masticate an ichthyosaurus."' " First, Markovits insists that both
Turner and I have committed a fundamental error in equating supracompetitive pricing with collusive pricing.' Markovits believes it essential to
distinguish between those prices above the competitive level that reflect the
"competitive advantages" (that is, monopoly power) of individual firms
and those that reflect the "oligopolistic margins" resulting from explicit or
tacit collusion among firms. He worries that higher than competitive prices
might be used-incorrectly-to support an inference of collusion in circumstances where the higher prices actually reflected the monopoly power of
individual firms. He ignores, however, the possibility that "competitive
advantages" might result from a tacit or explicit division of markets.
Second, Markovits insists on distinguishing between two forms of oligopolistic pricing, which he terms "natural" and "contrived."' 7 "Natural" oligopoly pricing is that form of what I term tacitly collusive pricing
that arises simply from a mutual awareness by competing sellers that all
would be better off if their prices were higher, an awareness that motivates
the sellers to refrain from competing with one another. Natural oligopoly
pricing appears to be a concept similar or identical to Turner's "conscious
parallelism" or "oligopolistic interdependence," and Markovits agrees with
Turner that it does not violate section i of the Sherman Act.' But his reason
for reaching this result is sharply different from Turner's. Markovits be55. Quoted in M. MACK, JEREmy BENrrIAt 1748-1792, at 196 (z962). My objection to Markovits' writing style is not that he relies excessively on the jargon of economics, or on the geometrical and
algebraical formulations in which economists like to express their ideas. His article is in fact relatively
free of standard economics jargon and contains no mathematics. (There are, however, a large number
of arithmetical illustrations.)
The problems with Markovits' style are different. They include the proliferation of new and unfamiliar terms and acronyms (POP's, SOP's, CA's, CCA's, BCA's, etc.), abstractness, prolixity, and
a lack of dear organization. His style presents enormous difficulties even for the economically sophisticated reader. The difficulties are unnecessary since his ideas are basically quite simple, as I have tried
to indicate in my summary of the article in the text.
A special problem is created by Markovits' heavy reliance on confusing and sometimes unfairly
biased arithmetical illustrations to carry his points. Consider, for instance, the example discussed in
Part I, supra note i, at 519-28, which appears to be an important part of Markovits' analysis of "contrived" oligopoly pricing. In presenting the example, Markovits imposes the condition that sellers cannot change their prices by fractions of a cent. This seems reasonable enough-until one realizes that
the assumed marginal cost of the product in question is only one cent, which means that the minimum
price increase above the competitive level that a seller can make is a io0 percent increase. Thus, if
price is initially at the competitive level, the seller's only choice is between doubling his price and not
changing it at all. If this condition were relaxed and sellers were permitted to vary their price continuously, Markovits' analysis of contrived oligopoly pricing, which depends on sellers' inability to
make flexible price responses, would be undermined.
16. See Part 1, supra note x, at 494-97, 500.
17. See PartII, supra note i, at 721-29; PartIV, supra note i, at 45 na.4-5.
18. See PartII, supra note r, at 738-40.
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lieves that section i reaches only agreements that would constitute contracts
under the common law or the Uniform Commercial Code, and mere mutual forbearance to reduce price or expand output does not create such a
contract.19 Unlike Turner, but like me, Markovits believes that natural
oligopolistic pricing should be forbidden by antitrust law.
"Contrived" oligopolistic pricing occurs when a seller, having raised
his price above the competitive level, would find it costly to reduce the new
price immediately and uses threats of predatory pricing or other forms of
exclusionary conduct to deter competing sellers from undercutting. Markovits reasons that if for some reason it is costly to change a price once set
(but why should it be?), oligopolistic pricing is very difficult to effectuate,
because the costs of retracting a higher than competitive price make the
seller who sets such a price highly vulnerable to being undercut by competing sellers. In these circumstances, says Markovits, oligopolistic pricing
can occur only if the first seller threatens to retaliate at some later time
against any competitor who takes advantage of his vulnerability or, what
would have the same effect, promises a reward for not taking such advantage. Markovits believes that contrived oligopolistic pricing, unlike the
"natural" variety, violates section i of the Sherman Act because the threat
or promised reward creates a contract.2" However, he offers no evidence or
reason to believe that contrived oligopolistic pricing is at all common. He
does not discuss the conditions under which threats of retaliation would
be credible or explain why the costs of lowering a price once set, if high,
would not simply deter a seller from raising his price above the competitive
level in the first place.
I shall skip for a moment to the fourth part of Markovits' article where
he explains why both natural and contrived oligopolistic pricing are allocatively inefficient. 2 Most economists would not consider the question
interesting; they would assume that tacitly (as well as explicitly) collusive
prices result in a misallocation of resources and leave it at that. However,
22
because Markovits takes very seriously the problem of the "second best,
he is unwilling to base antitrust policy on the traditional allocative objection
to monopoly: that by raising price above the cost of production, the monopolist deflects some consumers to substitute products that actually cost
society more to make, and only seem less expensive to the consumer because
of the artificially high price of the monopolized product. The theory of the
second best teaches that if, for example, the substitute product is also mo19.

See id. at 738.

2o. See id. at 740-44. Markovits believes the threat of retaliation would violate § 2 of the Sher-

man Act. Id. at 740. But he never discusses the elements of a section 2 violation, so the basis of his
belief is unclear.
21. See Part IV, supra note i. See also Checklist, supra note i.
22. The classic statement of the theory is Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best,
24 1 v.ECON. STuDMs IX (1956).
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nopolized, the elimination of monopoly in the first market and consequent
fall in the price level may, by inducing an increase in the output of the
first product relative to that of the second, produce a worse allocation of
resources than if the monopoly had been left undisturbed, since the social
cost of producing the second product may be lower than that of producing
the first.
Troubled by the implications of the theory of the second best, Markovits
suggests a number of respects in which monopoly or oligopoly pricing still
may be said to reduce economic welfare. He also discusses, in a perfunctory
fashion, certain ethical objections to the possible income-distribution effects
of supracompetitive pricing. But he does not make the most straightforward
argument to show that monopoly and oligopoly pricing impose significant
costs on society apart from those resulting from substitution against the
monopolist's product. This argument is that the lure of monopoly profits
induces firms to expend resources on efforts to obtain a share of those profits.
I do not refer to investments in producing, or producing more of, the
product in question; the costs incurred in expanding production to take
up the slack created by the monopolist's limitation of his output are not
socially wasteful-except to the extent that the firms expanding production
are less efficient than the monopolist. My argument centers on the extent
to which firms may instead expend resources on forming cartels, concealing
them from the government, or providing services that are not cost justified
in terms of consumer demand-even though they may enable a firm to
increase its market share and thus its profits." Through such activities,
monopoly profits are transformed into socially wasteful expenditures, and
these expenditures, together with the expenditures of the government and
others on trying to prevent or punish monopolizing, are social costs of collusive pricing that are unaffected by the theory of the second best."
23. As an extreme example of such private costs, assume that because of an international airline
cartel a carrier obtains a pure monopoly profit of $50 on every transatlantic seat that it sells. It would
be willing to spend up to $50 per passenger to attract passengers from its competitors and might therefore, for example, offer each passenger a meal that cost $5o more to produce than the normal airline
meal. Yet the meal might be worth only, say, $5 more to the passenger, in which event the airline
cartel would be imposing a social cost of $45 per meal served.
24. See Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. EcON. 807 (1975).
Markovits discusses one aspect of these costs of monopoly in his article, Fixed Input (Investment)
Competition and the Variability of Fixed Inputs (Investment): Their Nature, Determinants,and Significance, 24 STAN. L. Rav. 507 (1972). His term "fixed input competition" (and the related concept
of quality-and-variety-increasing (QV) investment competition) refers to one form of service competition, and he points out that a market in which price competition is prevented will generate a
socially excessive amount of this competition. It is unclear, however, why he confines his attention to
a single aspect of the more general tendency of monopoly profits to be transformed into social costs
and ignores the literature discussing the general tendency, such as Tullock, The Welfare Costs of
Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967). Incidentally, the Tullock-Posner analysis
of the costs of monopoly undermines the income-distribution objection to monopoly that Markovits also
makes. See Posner, supra, at 821.
As a detail, I reject the policy implications Markovits draws from the theory of second best, but
since our disagreement over that point is unrelated to the issue of oligopolistic pricing, I do not want
to pursue the point here.
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The remaining question for Markovits, discussed in the third part of
his article, is whether it is possible at reasonable cost to identify oligopolistic
pricing so as to be able to punish it either under the Sherman Act or under
an amended statute that would enable enforcers to reach the "natural" as
well as the "contrived" form. This is the issue at the heart of the disagreement between Turner and myself, and Markovits disagrees strongly with
both of us-with Turner for doubting that proof of oligopolistic pricing is
feasible, with me for believing that the methods that I have proposed for
proving such pricing are workable.
His criticism of my suggestions for proving tacit collusion is in the
main simply an application of his first point, mentioned above: the danger
of equating supracompetitive with collusive pricing. He notes, for example,
that systematic price discrimination, which I have suggested could be used
as evidence of collusion, might represent simply the exercise of the limited
monopoly power possessed by one or several individual sellers in the market. Evaluated from this perspective, his criticisms can be summarized as a
warning-which I accept-that economic evidence frequently is ambiguous. In addition, however, he apparently deems my tests fatally ambiguous
because they do not discriminate between natural and contrived oligopoly
pricing," which, of course, they were never designed to do.
Having rejected the methods I proposed, Markovits-very briefly-suggests his own methods for establishing oligopolistic pricing. 6 His first
method consists of determining what the defendants' highest nonoligopolistic prices could be, and then comparing them with their actual prices; if
the former are below the latter, the trier of facts can conclude that the firms
are guilty of collusion. This kind of proof seems a good deal more elusive
than anything I have suggested. I was not surprised to find Markovits acknowledging its possible impracticality. To determine a firm's highest nonoligopolistic price in a particular market would require knowledge both of
the firm's long-run marginal costs and of the elasticity of demand for its
product. These are formidably difficult measurements to attempt to make
in the litigation process.
Markovits proposes four allegedly less complicated methods of proving
oligopolistic pricing. I was able to identify only two distinct methods. One
consists of comparing prices charged by the alleged oligopolist in different
markets, or at different times, in order to see whether the difference in
actual price can be explained by a difference in the oligopolist's highest nonoligopolistic prices. The other consists of showing either that one seller had
25. Markovits' criticisms of my suggested methods of proving collusion appear in Part III, supra
note i, at 319-29.
26. See id. at 310-14. Markovits devotes only a very small portion of his immense article to the

central question of how to prove tacit collusion.
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retaliated against another seller who had offered a lower price to the first
seller's customer, or that the second seller had failed to offer a lower price to
that customer when he could have done so. Both methods require a determination of the highest nonoligopolistic price that the seller could have
charged in the market in question unless perhaps there is evidence of predatory pricing. We thus are taken back to Markovits' very first method of
proof which he acknowledges may be infeasible.
III. CRITIQuE OF MAovrrs' APPROACH

A. Individualversus Collective Power Over Price
Markovits' article makes one worthwhile point, albeit it was Chamberlin's before it was Markovits':27 it is descriptively inaccurate to divide the

world of business firms into monopolists on the one hand and perfectly
competitive firms on the other. Even in markets that are reasonably competitive, individual firms may possess elements or degrees of monopoly
power. For example, there is probably effective competition among the producers of motion pictures. Yet every motion picture confers a bit of monopoly power, legally protected by the copyright laws, on the producer. It is
for this reason, I assume, that systematic price discrimination, in the form of
differential first-run and second-run pricing of motion pictures, has persisted long after the apparent cessation of express collusion among the producers.
Markovits is correct to note this limitation on using evidence of a higher
than competitive price level, or of other noncompetitive pricing behavior, as
a basis for inferring the existence of oligopolistic pricing. However, the distinction is not a decisive objection to the sorts of evidence that I have suggested; it is simply one more complication in the use of economic evidence,
and I believe a manageable complication.
There are two possible sources of confusion between individual and collective monopoly power. The first is the failure to define the relevant market correctly. If the market is defined so broadly as to include distant as well
as close substitutes, the market definition may conceal a firm that in fact has
significant monopoly power because there are no close substitutes for its
product, even though the firm has less than a monopoly share of the more
broadly defined market. Observing symptoms of noncompetitive pricing in
that "market" might lead the antitrust enforcers to believe that the firm was
colluding with its competitors, whereas in fact it was simply exercising its
individual monopoly power. Market definition is a serious problem in many
types of antitrust cases; it would be a serious problem in a collusion case
based solely on economic evidence.
27. See E. CHABEm LiN, TnE TmoRY op MONOPOLISTIC COmPETITION (8th ed. I962).
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Second, even in a narrowly defined market, there may be firms that possess some monopoly power, in that a slight increase in price by one firm
would not cause it to lose all of its sales to competitors. In other words, each
firm does not face a perfectly horizontal demand curve. This sort of monopoly power, however, is unlikely to generate sufficiently gross evidence of monopoly to be detected by the inevitably crude methods of even an economically oriented antitrust enforcement program.
A simple formula should help in showing why "competitive advantages," to use Markovits' term, are unlikely to contribute significantly to
supracompetitive prices. A profit-maximizing firm sells its output at the
price that equates its marginal revenue (MR) to its marginal cost (MC).
For a firm having some power over price (a "monopolist") marginal revenue is equal to Pm(i - i/E), where P. is the monopolist's price and E (expressed for simplicity as a positive number) is the elasticity of demand that
he faces at that price. Since MR = MC, and since the competitive price in
the market in question (P,) is equal simply to marginal cost, Pc - Pr(ii/E), which can be rewritten Pn/Pc = E/(E - i). This formula, which

relates the ratio of the profit-maximizing monopoly and competitive prices
to the elasticity of demand at the monopoly price, indicates that a firm that
enjoys only a modest amount of monopoly power will not charge a price
substantially higher than the competitive level. Suppose, for example, that
the elasticity of demand at the monopoly price is io, meaning (approximately) that a one percent increase in the price of the firm's product would
lead to a io percent reduction in the quantity sold. Plainly, the firm has
some monopoly power; if it had none, a one percent price increase would
result in a ioo percent, not io percent, reduction in quantity sold. Yet the
monopoly power that this firm possesses only allows it to charge a monopoly price ii percent higher than the competitive price in the market. Such a
differential is probably too small to be noticed by antitrust enforcers using
the kind of economic evidence likely to be employed in a collusion case.
Only gross departures from competitive pricing are apt to be swept within
the net of an economically oriented antitrust enforcement program; such
departures are unlikely to result from the activities of a single, noncolluding firm having a less than monopolistic market share-unless the market
has been defined too broadly.
My conclusion is that if markets are carefully defined-an important
qualification-it will be the rare case where observed noncompetitive pricing is due to the individual monopoly power of the firms in the market.
Moreover, in a case where the plaintiff sought to base an inference of collusion on economic evidence alone, I would allow the defendant to rebut by
showing that its noncompetitive pricing behavior was due not to collusion
but to the possession of a lawful source of monopoly power, such as a
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patent or copyright, or a very large market share. Experience with cases in
which this defense was asserted would eventually reveal how important
such factors were in explaining substantial departures from competitive
pricing-the only kind, to repeat, likely to generate enough evidence to
enable the plaintiff to make out a prima facie case of illegality in the first
place.
B. Markovits"Methods of Proving Tacit Collusion
More questionable than Markovits' criticisms of my suggested methods
of proving tacit collusion is his insensitivity to the difficulties involved in
using his suggested methods. I would find his article more persuasive if it
said that since in his view it is impossible to distinguish between individual
and collective monopoly power, Turner was right in arguing that tacit
collusion is beyond the effective reach of conduct-oriented legal remedies.
Markovits does not say this. Instead, he rejects the tests for tacit collusion
that I suggest using on the ground that they are ambiguous, 8 and then goes
on to propose alternative tests that are even more ambiguous.
His idea of directly trying to measure the highest nonoligopolistic price
that a seller could charge surely is unrealistic, as he himself comes close to
conceding. His allegedly simpler methods of proof, involving comparative
price evidence, are no more realistic; they are in fact nothing more than
comparisons of highest nonoligopolistic prices. His suggestion that antitrust enforcers seek evidence of retaliation and failure to undercut a competitor requires in the one case proving predatory pricing and in the other
measuring, once again, the highest nonoligopolistic price. Proof of predatory pricing is, to be sure, relatively straightforward compared to the comparative-price evidence that Markovits suggests, but it would be a drastic
abridgment of the legal remedies for tacit collusion to apply them only in
the presumably very rare case where one of the colluding sellers had used
predatory price cutting or the threat thereof to enforce the collusive agreement. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, Markovits' methods of proof
might overlook cases where individual firms' "competitive advantages" resulted from a tacit division of markets among the firms.
C. "Natural" versus "Contrived" OligopolisticPricing
The most dubious point of all urged in Markovits' article is his suggested
distinction between the legal treatment under section i of the Sherman
28. In part, as mentioned earlier, he deems my tests ambiguous because they do not distinguish
between natural and contrived oligopolistic pricing, a distinction on which he believes, erroneously
as I argue infra, the application of the Sherman Act to oligopolistic pricing turns. Since he would like
to see the Act amended to forbid natural as well as contrived oligopolistic pricing, this criticism of my
tests is of no importance to his economic analysis.
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Act of "natural," and that of "contrived," oligopolistic pricing.2 I know of
no basis in statute, precedent, or policy for limiting section i to contracts
that but for antitrust policy would be enforceable under the common law or
the Uniform Commercial Code. Certainly Markovits offers no reason why
he thinks it worthwhile asking whether a price fixing conspiracy might
fail as a contract for want of consideration, or mutuality, or any of the
other technical requirements of the law of contracts. When in my 1969
article I compared tacit collusion to the unilateral contract," it was not in
order to claim that tacit collusion might create enforceable obligations in a
society that had no policy against collusion, but simply to point out that
there were sufficient analogies between unilateral contracts and tacit collusive arrangements to enable the courts to include the latter within the broad
scope of section i without thereby doing violence to the statutory language.
Turner himself has acknowledged that the issue with regard to the lawfulness of tacit collusion under section i is not whether it can be described
as an agreement but whether it should be treated as an unlawful agreement,
a matter of antitrust policy.3' I am astonished that Markovits should treat
the problem as one of contract law rather than of antitrust policy.
If I am correct that there is no basis for different legal treatment of natural and contrived oligopolistic pricing, then the distinction has no utility
whatsoever. The only significance that Markovits ascribes to it is legal; he
does not suggest that distinguishing between natural and contrived oligopolistic pricing helps to illuminate differences in the observed behavior of
business firms-indeed, he does not discuss any such differences.
Markovits does not even suggest that "contrived" oligopoly pricing is a
common phenomenon. One imagines it is not. It requires both that a seller
have difficulty changing a price once set, and that he be able to practice
predatory price cutting effectively. The joint satisfaction of these conditions
is probably rare; in any event, Markovits has made no effort to establish that
it is common. I am surprised that he should have devoted so many words
to trying to demonstrate the illegality of a practice which, for aught that he
has shown, does not exist in the real world.
To summarize, Markovits' immense article contains a useful reminder
that noncompetitive behavior is not always a result of express or tacit collusion; it may be the result of the individual monopoly power of firms not
ordinarily regarded as monopolists. If there are other valuable insights in
the article, they have eluded my understanding.
See text accompanying notes i7-2o supra.
30. See Posner, supra note 2, at 1576.
31. See Turner, supra note 7, at 665.
29.
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